![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() I close the chapter with a discussion of the last part of the Dialogues, usually referred to as “Philo’s reversal,” to evaluate whether Philo’s sudden profession of faith can be understood as an avowal of theism, fideism, or deism, or simply as a disguise of his atheistic inclinations. I show that this belief is a probability based on an analogy by, first, examining the possibilities that it is a natural belief or a proof, and discarding both options based on Philo’s use of some of the rules for causal inferences in his skeptical objections. The third section of the chapter, centers on determining what kind of belief, in Hume’s typology, is held by natural theism. After this, I draw a parallel between the two dialogues’ philosophical arguments and narrative strategies, to prepare the ground for the most detailed analysis of Hume’s application of his normative theory of belief in the Dialogues. Given the significant influence that Cicero’s De Natura Deorum had on Hume’s Dialogues, I begin the chapter by surveying the most important references to Cicero in Hume’s correspondence and philosophical works. In this chapter, I discuss how Hume applies his normative theory of belief – consisting of a typology of beliefs and a set of rules to guide causal inferences – to the theses of natural theism in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. ![]()
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